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I. INTRODUCTION
Researching the President of the United States
on the Internet, a fourth grade student types in
www.whitehouse.com I on her home computer, as-
suming she will be taken to the official govern-
ment White House website. Instead, the unsus-
pecting child is whisked to a world of sexually ex-
plicit material and adult pornography. The In-
ternet also enables many children to communi-
cate with strangers via e-mail, chat rooms, or in-
stant messaging. Many of these strangers may
turn out to be child predators, and their contact
with an unknowing child can lead to unwanted
sexual solicitation. Incidents such as these,
backed by statistics, studies, and personal testi-
mony, reveal that every day, children surfing the
Internet are being exposed to harmful and inap-
propriate material. This exposure, coupled with
the fact that Internet use has become part of a
child's daily routine, 2 has prompted Congress to
act-to safeguard children from these online dan-
gers.
So far, however, congressional efforts to protect
children online, which began in 1996,3 have
proven unsuccessful. Courts have repeatedly ren-
dered federal legislation that regulates Internet
content unconstitutional. Ultimately, each unsuc-
cessful attempt has strengthened Congress' re-
solve to craft new legislation in this policy area
that addresses the courts' concerns.
I Website dedicated to being the "worldwide leader in
adult and political entertainment," at http://www.
whitehouse.com (last visited Sept. 8, 2003).
2 U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, A NATION ONLINE: How
AMERICANS ARE EXPANDING THEIR USE OF THE INTERNET 53
(2002), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/dn/
anationonline2.pdf [hereinafter U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE].
3 The first bill enacted by Congress to protect children
from harmful material online was the Communications De-
In its most recent attempt, the Dot Kids Imple-
mentation and Efficiency Act of 2002, 4 Congress
has enacted the narrowest legislation to date.
Under this law, a new secondary domain site will
be created exclusively for children. The site, oth-
erwise known as a "cyber playground"5 for chil-
dren on the Internet, will be established by the
government via a third party registry. Once again,
however, in enacting this legislation, the govern-
ment has established a content-based regulation
that will not survive the highest level of First
Amendment scrutiny.
The Supreme Court has recognized a compel-
ling need to protect children from harmful mater-
ials but, as this Comment will discuss, Congress'
attempts to regulate such content on the Internet
have not fared well. Therefore, legal analysis of
congressional activity in this area is important as
we go forward, and the Internet begins to play an
even greater role than it does today in children's
educational and social lives.
This Comment will analyze whether the re-
cently enacted Dot Kids Implementation and Effi-
ciency Act of 2002 is constitutional under the First
Amendment. It is not the position of this Com-
ment to determine from a moral or political
standpoint whether or not the Internet should be
regulated. This Comment assumes that it is Con-
gress' intent to do so, and addresses whether the
cency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §230 (2000) (declared unconsti-
tutional by Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)).
4 Dot Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-317, 116 Stat. 2766 (2002) (to be codified at
47 U.S.C. §§901, 902, 941).
5 Karen MacPherson, Dot.Kids Proposal Praised for Motive,
Debated Over Method, PIF[SBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 19,
2001, at A17 (dubbing a safe place for children on the In-
ternet a "cyber-playground") [hereinafter MacPherson].
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legal means that Congress has chosen to accom-
plish this end are constitutional.
Part II of this Comment will address Internet
use among children, focusing on the harmful ma-
terial they are being exposed to online. Part III
defines freedom of speech protections and ex-
plains how each medium of expression presents
special First Amendment problems in regulation.
Parts IV, V, and VI explore Congress' first at-,
tempts at Internet content regulation, and how
they have fared in the courts. Part VII analyzes
Congress' most recent attempt at regulation in
this area and demonstrates that the statute is un-
constitutional. Finally, Part VIII of this Comment
provides some suggestions on how best to protect
children in the context of this unique, global, and
revolutionary medium, the Internet.
II. THE INTERNET TODAY
First baptized "ARPANET," 6 the Internet began
as a United States military-led effort to design a
network that would allow computers operated by
the military, defense contractors, and universities
involved in defense-related research to communi-
cate with one another, even if parts of the net-
work were damaged during war.7 From its primi-
tive beginnings and limited use, the Internet has
grown to become a common fixture in the every
day lives of millions of Americans across the
United States ("U.S."). In fact, as a U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce report on Internet use states,
"few technologies have spread as quickly."8
Today, approximately 143 million Americans,9
which translates into more than half of the na-
tion, are using the Internet. This number, esti-
mated by the Department of Commerce in Sep-
tember 2001,10 represents an increase of 26.5 mil-
lion people in just thirteen months." And, while
the Internet may have had its beginnings in the
6 See WEBOPED1A.COM: ONLINE DICTIONARY FOR COMPUTER
AND INTERNET TERMS, at http://www.webopedia.com (last vis-
ited Sept. 2, 2003) ("ARPANET" gets its name from its crea-
tor, the United States Defense Advanced Research Project
Agency (ARPA)).
7 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(providing extensive findings of fact describing the character
and history of the Internet), affd, Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844 (1997).
8 U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, supra note 2, at 1.
* Id. at4.
10 Id.
I, Id.
U.S., the widespread use of it is not confined to
our nation's borders. The Commerce Depart-
ment reports that Internet use is on the rise in
countries around the world; it is a "global phe-
nomenon." 12
A. Children and the Internet
While Internet use is increasing for people in
all age groups, children and teenagers use the In-
ternet more than any other group.' 3 This phe-
nomenon is partly attributed to Internet access at
schools. More and more, children are using the
Internet as an aid in completing homework, re-
searching information, and as a form of entertain-
ment-playing games, using e-mail, engaging in
chat rooms, listening to the radio, or watching
movies.14
Because children are so adept at using com-
puters and accessing information on the Internet,
parents and caregivers have expressed great
concern about children being exposed to
inappropriate 5 material on the Internet. In fact,
for the first time in its history, the September
2001 survey conducted by the Department. of
Commerce' 6 asked respondents whether they
were more concerned about exposure of children
to inappropriate material on the Internet or on
television. A majority of respondents, over 68%,
said that they were more concerned about their
children's exposure to unsafe or harmful material
on the Internet than on television.' 7
However, while concerns about harmful or in-
appropriate material on the Internet continue to
exist, and have likely increased over the years, it
seems that Internet use, especially among chil-
dren and young adults, has not waned. Given the
continued high level of use, congressional leaders
must consider what can be done, within the con-
fines of the Constitution, to keep children safe
12 Id. at 5.
'3 Id. at 1.
14 Id. at 52-53.
15 In legislation that Congress has enacted since 1996, in-
appropriate material for children has been defined as: "of-
fensive material," Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47
U.S.C. §230 (2000); "material that is harmful to minors,"
Child Online Protection Act of 2002, 47 U.S.C. §231(e) (6)
(2000); and material that is not "suitable for minors," Dot
Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-317, 116 Stat. 2766 (2002).
16 U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, supra note 2, at 53.
17 Id.
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from the inappropriate and harmful material that
is placed in this most public and accessible forum,
the Internet. It is important to address two key
questions: just how much inappropriate material
is out there, and how accessible is it to children.
B. Sexually Explicit and Harmful Material on
the Internet
While the Internet has become a major re-
search and communications tool to enhance chil-
dren's learning and increase their knowledge, it is
also host to a wealth of sexually explicit
material-from the "modestly titillating to the
hardest-core."' Surfing the Internet, children are
inadvertently uncovering adult material online,
and even more threatening than that, they are be-
ing exposed to potential predation and sexual so-
licitation.' 9 In testimony before the Senate Com-
merce Committee in September 2002, Ruben
Rodruiguez of the National Center for Missing &
Exploited Children ("NCMEC") testified that
based on a study funded by NCMEC, "one in four
youth encountered unwanted pornography on-
line, and one in five youth were sexually solicited
online in the past year."20
It is true that much of the pornography and
sexually offensive material online is deliberately
accessed by Internet users.2 1 However, even more
of it can be uncovered inadvertently. Publishers
of such material routinely use "copycat URLs" to
take advantage of typographical errors and inno-
cent mistakes. 22 In doing so, children can mistak-
enly access these inappropriate sites. For in-
stance, children attempting to find the official
White House website will unintentionally access a
18 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
19 See generally CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN RESEARCH CTR.,
NATIONAL CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, ONLINE
VICTIMIZATION: A REPORT ON THE NATION'S YOUTH (2000)
[hereinafter CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN RESEARCH CTR.] (pro-
viding the first scientifically-based data on the risks faced by
children on the Internet).
20 Child-Friendly Internet Domain: Hearing on S.2537, Dot
Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act of 2002, Before the Senate
Subcomm. on Sci., Tech. and Space of the Comm. on Commerce, Sci.
and Transp., 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Ruben Rodri-
guez, Director, Exploited Child Unit, National Center for
Missing & Exploited Children).
21 H.R. REP. No. 105-775, at 10 (1998).
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 11.
pornographic site if they type in www.whitehouse.
com rather than www.whitehouse.gov, the official
government site. 2:  In addition, simple searches
using innocuous terms such as toys, dollhouses,
girls, boys, pets, teen, cheerleader, actress, beanie
babies, and doggy can lead children to inappro-
priate websites. 24
Not surprisingly, the potential harm to children
caused by adult material online and the fear of
children being solicited by sexual predators over
the Internet has not only alarmed parents and
caregivers, but law enforcement officials and legis-
lators as well. This concern has translated into
several attempts by Congress to enact legislation
regulating content on the Internet. Congress'
first attempt at regulation came in 1996 with the
Communications Decency Act.2 5 Even after the
Supreme Court declared this Act unconstitu-
tional, congressional efforts to protect children
online have continued. 26 Most recently, Congress
enacted the Dot Kids Implementation and Effi-
ciency Act 2 7 in an effort to provide a
"cyber-playground" 2 for children on the Internet.
The following sections will address the constitu-
tionality of these legislative efforts to protect chil-
dren by regulating Internet content.
III. FREEDOM OF SPEECH PROTECTIONS
Freedom of speech is a fundamental right.29 As
such, the government cannot regulate the con-
tent of protected speech. 31' However, this right is
not always absolute. 3 1 A presumptively invalid con-
tent-based regulation of protected speech3 2 can
overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality
if it meets the strict scrutiny standard established
25 47 U.S.C. §230.
26 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 884-85 (1997).
27 Dot Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-317, 116 Stat. 2766 (2002).
28 MacPherson, supra note 5, at A17 (dubbing a safe
place for children on the Internet a "cyber-playground").
29 The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution pro-
vides: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
30 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992)
(holding that the First Amendment did not permit the gov-
ernment to impose prohibitions on a speaker's viewpoint).
-31 See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571-72 (1942) ("[li]t is well understood that the right of free
speech is not absolute at all times and under all circum-
stances.").
32 See t.A. V., 505 U.S. at 391.
2004]
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by the Supreme Court.-" Under strict scrutiny, the
regulation must be justified by a compelling gov-
ernmental interest, must be narrowly tailored,
and must be the least restrictive means to
effectuate that interest.34
Adhering to a strict scrutiny standard, if a court
finds that there is a compelling governmental in-
terest in enacting the legislation, it will then in-
quire whether the content-based regulation is nar-
rowly tailored. This can be determined by look-
ing to see if the statute sweeps too broadly, mean-
ing it prohibits more than what is constitutionally
allowed; or, if the statute is vague, meaning the
legal standards lack sufficient clarity to provide
adequate guidance. If the court finds that the
regulation falls into one of these categories, then
it will deem the regulation unconstitutional for its
failure to be narrowly tailored.
A. Medium-Specific Regulation
The Supreme Court has explained that "each
medium of expression presents special First
Amendment problems" 35 and therefore, because
of each medium's unique characteristics, the
Court has held that regulation in certain media is
justifiedi 6 In other words, the First Amendment
does not prohibit all government regulation of
content of protected speech; it depends on the
context of the broadcast.37 While regulations in
certain media are held to the Court's highest stan-
dard, strict scrutiny, regulations in other media
are held to a lower or intermediate level of
33 See Turner Broad. System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,
662-63 (1994).
34 See, e.g., U.S. v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S.
803, 813 (2000) (holding that a content-based speech regula-
tion must satisfy all three criteria: it must be narrowly tai-
lored, promote a compelling Government interest, and the
least restrictive alternative to serve the Government's pur-
pose).
35 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978)
(quotingJoseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502-03
(1952)).
36 Id. at 744-48.
37 Id. at 746-48.
38 See, e.g., id. at 747-48; FCC v. League of Women Voters,
468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 386-87 (1969).
39 Miami Herald Pub'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258
(1974).
40 See Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 386 (stating that,
"Although broadcasting is clearly a medium affected by a
First Amendment interest ... differences in the characteris-
tics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment
standards applied to them."); Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 759
scrutiny. -38 For instance, print media, including
newspapers and magazines, receive the highest
level of First Amendment protection."9 On the
other hand, traditional broadcast media, encom-
passing radio and television, deserve a lower level
of First Amendment protection. 4 The Supreme
Court has rationalized a lower level of protection
for traditional broadcasting for various reasons,
including the history of extensive government
regulation of the broadcast medium; 4' the scarcity
of available broadcast frequencies; 42 and, the "in-
vasive" nature of the medium.4 3
For example, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,44 Jus-
tice Stevens writing for the Court cited specific
qualities that distinguished traditional broadcast-
ing from other media and afforded it a lower level
of First Amendment protection. 4 5 First, he noted,
broadcasting has "established a uniquely pervasive
presence in the lives of all Americans."4 6 He ex-
plained that because a broadcast enters the- pri-
vacy of a home, "the individual's right to be left
alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment
rights of an intruder."47 Second, Justice Stevens
distinguished broadcasting because it is "uniquely
accessible to children, even those too young to
read."4 Children need only to turn on the radio
or television and listen to be instantly impacted by
the broadcast. And, as Justice Stevens explained,
the government has an interest in protecting chil-
dren from inappropriate messages that are easily
accessible to them.49 These qualities, explained
the Court, distinguish traditional broadcasting
from other media and uniquely justify a lesser
(refining the decision in Red Lion Broad. Co.).
41 See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 400.
42 Id.. at 386-390 (explaining that because the broadcast
spectrum was limited, the FCC could place restrictions on
broadcast licensees, including restrictions with regard to con-
tent); see also Turner Broad. System, Inc., 512 U.S. at 637-39
(finding that cable television does not have the same "scar-
city" of access problems that are associated with traditional
broadcast). Scarcity of access refers to the availability of spec-
trum space for traditional broadcasting, which is regulated by
the government. This access problem is not an issue with
cable television. Id.
43 Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492
U.S. 115, 127-28 (1989) (contrasting a commercial telephone
communication to the "invasive" nature of an "outburst on a
radio broadcast").
44 438 U.S. 726.
45 Id. at 74849.
46 Id. at 748.
47 Id. (citing Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728
(1970)).
48 Id. at 749.
49 Id. (citing Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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standard of review for broadcast media.50
In contrast to traditional broadcasting, the Su-
preme Court has applied different standards of
First Amendment protection to cable television.
In Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, the Supreme
Court disagreed with the government's argument
that the lesser standard of protection applied to
traditional broadcasting should also be applied to
cable. 5 1 Instead, the Court applied a more inter-
mediate level of protection to cable television be-
cause, as the Court rationalized, cable television
does not suffer from the same scarcity of access
problems that are associated with traditional
broadcasting. 52 While not a strict scrutiny stan-
dard, the standard applied to cable television was
a more heightened level of First Amendment pro-
tection than traditional broadcasting's standard.
53
Most recently, the Supreme Court has ruled
that cable television should enjoy the most height-
ened level of First Amendment protection when it
comes to content-based regulations. 54 In United
States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, the Court ex-
plained that there is a key difference between
cable and broadcasting media in that cable sys-
tems "have the capacity to block unwanted chan-
nels on a household-by-household basis."5 5 This
"blocking" capability, which allows viewers to bar
unwanted channels that broadcast inappropriate
or sexually explicit material, distinguishes cable
from traditional broadcast and eliminates the
concerns that Justice Stevens cited in Pacifica,5 6
which justified the most stringent level of scrutiny
for broadcasting. The Supreme Court ultimately
ruled that cable television should be on the same
end of the spectrum of First Amendment protec-
tion as print media.5 7
The Supreme Court has established the need to
apply "differential treatment,"58 or varying stan-
dards, to different media in the First Amendment
context. In explaining this treatment, the lower
court in Reno v. ACLU wrote:
Nearly fifty years ago, Justice Jackson recognized that
'[t] he moving picture screen, the radio, the newspaper,
50 See id. at 748-50.
51 Turner Broad. System, Inc., 512 U.S. at 661-62 (holding
that the appropriate standard to evaluate cable regulation is
an intermediate level of First Amendment scrutiny).
52 Id. at 637-38.
53 Id.
54 Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. at 813-14 (adopting
a strict scrutiny standard for cable television).
55 Id. at 815.
56 Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 748-49.
the handbill, the sound truck and the street corner ora-
tor have differing natures, values, abuses and dangers.
Each ...is a law unto itself.' The Supreme Court has
expressed this sentiment time and again since that
date, and differential treatment of the mass media has
become established First Amendment doctrine ....
This medium-specific approach to mass communica-
tion examines the underlying technology of the com-
munication to find the proper fit between First Amend-
ment values and competing interests." 
9
In understanding the importance the Court
places on determining the "proper fit" for differ-
ent media, it is not surprising that with the advent
of the Internet, the Court would invariably have
to determine where the Internet belongs on the
spectrum of First Amendment protection.
B. The Internet is Different than Other Media
It is almost impossible to compare the Internet
to one specific medium because it incorporates
numerous media-telephone, cable, traditional
broadcast, and print. Because it is easily accessi-
ble and offers such a wide variety of communica-
tion and information outlets-e-mail, chat rooms,
and websites, citing just a few-the Supreme
Court views it as a "unique medium-known to its
users as 'cyberspace'-located in no particular
geographical location but available to anyone,
anywhere in the world, with access to the In-
ternet."60 As such, it allows any individual or
group to publish their views and opinions online,
which are immediately made available to the en-
tire community of Internet users. In this way, one
could say that "freedom of speech [has taken] a
great leap forward" 6 1 in this "unique"62 forum.
Not surprisingly, because of its distinct and
novel media qualities, media-specific First Amend-
ment standards for the Internet have not been
clear from the beginning, which has made it diffi-
cult for Congress to understand its limits in regu-
lating Internet content. Congress faced its first
hurdle in its ability to regulate content with the
Supreme Court's decision in Reno v. ACLU 63
57 See Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. at 815.
58 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 873 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
59 Id. at 873 (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77
(1949)).
60 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997).
61 Joel Sanders, The Regulation of Indecent Material Accessi-
ble to Children On the Internet: Is it Really Alright to Yell Fire In a
Crowded Chat Room?, 39 CATH. LAw. 125, 125 (1999).
62 Reno v. ALCU, 521 U.S. at 851.
63 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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IV. CONGRESS' FIRST ATTEMPT AT
INTERNET CONTENT REGULATION:
COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT OF
1996
In its first attempt to protect children online,
Congress passed the Communications Decency
Act of 1996 ("CDA"), 64 which prohibited the
knowing transmission of obscene or "indecent"
messages to any recipient under the age of 18.65
The Act also prohibited knowingly sending over,
or displaying on the Internet, certain "patently of-
fensive" material in a manner available to individ-
uals under the age of 18.66 Under the CDA, the
term "patently offensive" was to be measured by
"contemporary community standards. ' 67
Even before the Act became law, free speech
groups and Members of Congress on both sides of
the aisle expressed concern that it was unconstitui-
tional. Then House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-
GA) declared that the bill was "clearly a violation
of free speech and it is a violation of the rights of
adults to communicate with each other."6 8 Demo-
cratic Senator Patrick Leahy also made it clear
that he was opposed to the government taking
steps to regulate the Internet.6 9
These initial concerns regarding the constitu-
tionality of the CDA were eventually realized
when, a year after the legislation was enacted, the
Supreme Court struck down two provisions of the
CDA-the "indecent transmission" provision and
the "patently offensive display" provision. 70 By de-
claring these provisions unconstitutional for their
vagueness and overbreadth, 71 the Court effec-
tively rendered the entire statute unenforceable.
Only the CDA's provision prohibiting the trans-
mission of obscene material to minors on the In-
ternet stood, which, as noted in Reno v. ACLU,7 2 is
already illegal under federal law73 because
64 Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §230
(2000).
65 Id. §223(a)
66 Id. §223(d).
67 Id. §223(d)(1)(B).
68 Progress Report (National Empowerment Television
broadcast, June 20, 1995).
69 See id. at 65-66.
70 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 858-59 (1997) (describ-
ing the two statutory provisions of the CDA that were being
challenged).
71 See id.
72 Id. at 878.
7- See 18 U.S.C. §§1464-65 (2000) (criminalizing the
obscenity does not receive First Amendment
protection.7 4
A. Supreme Court Establishes Strict Scrutiny
Standard for the Internet
One of the principle holdings in Reno v. ACLU
established that the Internet, deemed most analo-
gous to print media by the Supreme Court,
shared none of the special factors recognized by
the Court in previous cases to justify government
regulation of the Internet. 75 Therefore, the Court
found "no basis for qualifying the level of First
Amendment scrutiny" that the Court should apply
to the Internet.76 In effect, the Court ruled that
the Internet deserves the highest First Amend-
ment protection. 77
As the Court explained, the factors they had
cited for other media that is afforded lower level
scrutiny-history of extensive government regula-
tion; scarcity of access; and its "invasive" nature-
were not present in cyberspace.7 8 In addressing
each of these factors, Justice Stevens noted:
Neither before nor after the enactment of the CDA
have the vast democratic forums of the Internet been
subject to the type of government supervision and regu-
lation that has attended the broadcast industry. Moreo-
ver, the Internet is not as 'invasive' as radio or televi-
sion. The District Court specifically found that
'[c]ommunications over the Internet do not 'invade'
an individual's home or appear on one's computer
screen unbidden. Users seldom encounter content 'by
accident' . . . . Finally, unlike the conditions that pre-
vailed when Congress first authorized regulation of the
broadcast spectrum, the Internet can hardly be consid-
ered a 'scarce' expressive commodity. It provides rela-
tively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of
all kind .... As the District Court found, 'the content
on the Internet is as diverse as human thought.' 79
The Court, rejecting the government's argument
that the Internet should receive less than strict
broadcasting of obscene language over the radio, and
criminalizing the transportation of obscene materials).
74 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (estab-
lishing that obscenity is not protected under the First
Amendment and defining obscenity under a three-part con-junctive test). See also Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (1942).
75 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 870.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 868-70 (affirming the lower court's ruling and
holding that the "most stringent review" of the CDA's provi-
sions are necessary).
78 Id. at 868-69.
79 Id. at 868-70 (quoting from ACLU v. Reno, 929 F.
Supp. 824, 842-44 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
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scrutiny review, upheld the lower court's ruling,""
which concluded "that the Internet-as 'the most
participatory form of mass speech yet developed,'
is entitled to 'the highest protection from govern-
mental intrusion.' ,8"
B. Applying the Strict Scrutiny Standard to the
CDA
Applying strict scrutiny to the two challenged
provisions of the Communications Decency Act,
Sections 231(a) and (d),8 2 the Supreme Court
agreed with the government that it had a compel-
ling interest in protecting children from harmful
material,"3 but it found the provisions of the CDA
to be unconstitutional because they were both
vague and overbroad, and the statute was not the
least restrictive means necessary to further the
government's interest.8 4 In the Court's words, it
"lacks the precision that the First Amendment re-
quires when a statute regulates the content of
speech."
5
First, the Supreme Court held that the statute
was vague in that it failed to define "indecent"
and "patently offensive."8 6 The Court reasoned
that the absence of a definition of either of these
terms would invoke uncertainty among speakers
about what exactly these words mean, which
would cause a "chilling effect" among Internet
publishers and undermine "the likelihood" that
the CDA is narrowly tailored to further the gov-
ernment's interest in protecting children from
harmful materials on the Internet.
7
In addition, the Court held the CDA to be
overly broad for a number of reasons, including
the fact that the statute did not consist of a "socie-
tal value" requirement, as established in Miller v.
California,8 and thus, would suppress a "large
amount of speech that adults have a constitu-
tional right to receive and to address to one
80 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824.
81 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 863 (quoting ACLU v.
Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 883).
82 Id. at 858-60.
83 Id. at 875.
84 Id. at 874.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 871.
87 Id. at 871-72.
88 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (estab-
lishing a three-part test for obscenity, including a require-
ment that whether the work "which, taken as a whole," lacks
"serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value").
another."8 9 In other words, sexually explicit mate-
rial that is otherwise protected, meaning not "ob-
scene," and has such educational, artistic, or other
redeeming social value would fall within the scope
of the CDA's prohibitions. As the Court ex-
plained, this "burden on adult speech is unaccept-
able if less restrictive alternatives would be at least
as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose
that the statute was enacted to serve."9 1 Their ar-
gument was supported by the established princi-
ple that sexual expression that is not obscene is
protected by the First Amendment?1 1
The legislation was also deemed overly broad
because its coverage was "not limited to commer-
cial speech or commercial entities,"9 2 but rather
applied to all individuals posting messages on the
Internet. 3 The breadth of the statute's coverage
was viewed by the Court to be "wholly unprece-
dented."94
Additionally, the Supreme Court found that the
government had failed to prove that this legisla-
tion was the least restrictive means available to
achieve the compelling governmental interest in
protecting children. In the Court's view, the
"community standards" requirement of the CDA
would subject all Internet material to the stan-
dards of the most restrictive community.95 As ex-
plained by Justice Stevens in the majority opinion,
applying this approach to the Internet "means
that any communication available to a nation
wide audience will be judged by the standards of
the community most likely to be offended by the
message." 9 6 To illustrate the problems inherent in
using this approach, Justice Stevens continued,
" [s] imilarly, a parent who sent his 17-year-old col-
lege freshman information on birth control via e-
mail could be incarcerated even though neither
he, his child, nor anyone in their home commu-
nity found the material 'indecent' or 'patently of-
fensive,' if the college town's community thought
89 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 874.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 874-75 (citing Sable Communications of Califor-
nia, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) and quoting Carey
v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977), where
the Court stated, "[W] here obscenity is not involved, we have
consistently held that the fact that protected speech may be
offensive to some does not justify its suppression").
92 Id. at 877.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 877-78.
96 Id.
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otherwise.,, 7
While the Court recognized that the govern-
ment's interest in safeguarding the well-being of
children was compelling and justified,98 the Court
rendered the content-based regulation unconsti-
tutional because it was not narrowly tailored to
further that interest9 9 as required under strict
scrutiny review. In concluding, Justice Stevens de-
clared, "In Sable, we remarked that the speech re-
striction at issue there amounted to 'burning the
house to roast the pig.' The CDA, casting a far
darker shadow over free speech, threatens to
torch a large segment of the Internet commu-
nity."100
V. THE SECOND ATTEMPT: CHILDREN'S
ONLINE PROTECTION ACT OF 1998
After their first failed attempt at Internet con-
tent regulation, Congress responded with a new
legislative measure, the Child Online Protection
Act of 1998 ("COPA").1°I Dubbed "CDA II" by op-
ponents of the legislation, 102 it was enacted to
prohibit the sale of pornographic materials on the
Internet to minors. °1 0 3 Specifically, the legislation
prohibits a person from knowingly making, by
means of the World Wide Web, any communica-
tions for commercial purposes that are "harmful
to minors."'1 4 Those who violate the law could be
subject to criminal or civil penalties) 0 5 However,
only entities engaged in the commercial business
of making communications that contain material
harmful to minors can be held liable under the
law, as opposed to entities that merely access,
transport, or link the communications of another
person.10 6 The Act defines "material that is harm-
ful to minors" as:
any communication, picture, image, graphic image file,
article, recording, writing, or other matter of any kind
that is obscene or that-
(A) the average person, applying contemporary
97 Id. at 878.
98 Id. at 869-70 (quoting Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at
126, "We agreed that 'there is a compelling interest in pro-
tecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors'
which extended to shielding them from indecent messages
that are not obscene by adult standards").
99 See Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 126 ("It is not
enough to show that the Government's ends are compelling;
the means must be carefully tailored to achieve those ends.").
100 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 882.
101 Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §231 (2000).
102 Press Release, ACLU, In the Wake of the Starr Re-
community standards, would find, taking the
material as a whole and with respect to minors,
that such material is designed to appeal to, or is
designed to pander to, the prurient interest;
(B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner pa-
tently offensive with respect to minors, an actual
or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an ac-
tual or simulated normal or perverted sexual act,
or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-pu-
bescent female breast; and
(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value for minors. 10
7
While the legislation imposes civil and criminal
liabilities, it also provides an "affirmative de-
fense"10 8 to entities to avoid prosecution under
the law. This defense provides protection to a
commercial distributor of Internet material if they
make a "good faith" effort to restrict access to
harmful materials by minors "by requiring [the]
use of a credit card, debit account, adult access
code, or adult personal identification number; by
accepting a digital certificate that verifies age; or
by any other reasonable measures that are feasible
under available technology.' 10 9
A. Addressing the Supreme Court's Concerns
in Reno v. ACLU
In the House Commerce Committee report ad-
dressing the Child Online Protection Act,110 the
Committee cited statistics that revealed that in just
two years since the Communications Decency Act
of 1996 was enacted (and subsequently ruled un-
constitutional), the Internet's popularity and ac-
cessibility to minors had increased dramatically.
The population of minors on the Internet had al-
most doubled in a year according to the Federal
Trade Commission.111 In addition, that number
was likely to further increase as a "national effort
[was] underway to connect every school and li-
brary to the Internet."' 12 It was predicted that this
national effort would result in 95% of all schools
port, CDA II Approved by House Subcommittee, at http://
archive.aclu.org/news/n091798a.html (Sept. 17, 1998).
103 H.R. REP. No. 105-775, at 5 (1998).
104 47 U.S.C. §231 (a) (1).
105 Id. §231 (a).
106 H.R. REP. No. 105-775, at 12 (1998).
107 47 U.S.C. §231 (e) (6).
108 See id. §231(c).
109 Id. §231(c)(1)(A)-(C).
110 See H.R. REP. No. 105-775 (1998).
111 Id. at 9.
112 Id.
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having access to the Internet by the year 2000.11
Furthermore, the Committee found that as In-
ternet use and accessibility among children had
grown in just two years, so had the availability of
online pornography. In fact, the Committee
noted that in 1996, almost 50% of the content
available on the Internet was inappropriate for
children, and just two years later in 1998, that
number had grown to almost 70%. 1 14
In light of these findings, Congress recognized
that there was still a need-perhaps an even more
compelling need-for legislation restricting chil-
dren's exposure to harmful material on the In-
ternet. 1 15 Thus, even after the Supreme Court
ruled the CDA unconstitutional in Reno v. ACLU,
Congress made a second attempt to draft legisla-
tion that would restrict children's exposure to
pornographic material online, which became
known as the Children's Online Protection Act,
and was subsequently enacted into law.
In this second attempt, Congress took care to
draft legislation that specifically responded to the
First Amendment concerns raised by the Court in
Reno v. ACLU.'16 While the Supreme Court noted
that there is a well-recognized interest in protect-
ing children,1 17 the Court also stated that this in-
terest does not 'justify an unnecessary broad sup-
pression of speech addressed to adults."' 118 In
other words, the means used to further this inter-
est must be narrowly tailored. Aware of a need to
repair the CDA, Congress drafted COPA in such a
way that they believed the new law would "not re-
sult in an unnecessarily broad suppression of
speech."119
First, Congress addressed the definitions of "in-
decency" and "patently offensive" provided in the
CDA, which the Supreme Court deemed vague
and overly broad. 120 In COPA, language describ-
ing "material that is harmful to minors"'12 1 re-
placed the content standards provided in the
CDA. Under the definition provided in COPA,
11v Id.
114 Id. at 10.
115 Id. at 9-11.
116 Id. at 12.
117 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) (citing Gins-
berg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) and FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978)).
118 Id. at 875.
119 H.R. REP. No. 105-775, at 12 (1998).
120 See discussion infra Part V.
121 47 U.S.C. §231(e)(6).
Congress explicitly described material that is
harmful to minors, including material that "de-
picts, describes, or represents.., an actual or sim-
ulated sexual act or sexual contact.'"'1 22 In addi-
tion, Congress included the requirement that the
material is harmful to minors if, "taken as a whole,
[it] lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or sci-
entific value for minors."'12 3 By adding this lan-
guage and drafting a new definition, Congress
hoped to address concerns of overbreadth. This
language would limit the amount of material that
would have been unnecessarily suppressed under
the definitions provided in the CDA. As the
House Commerce Committee expressed, they in-
tended for this new definition to "parallel the
Ginsberg and Miller definitions of obscenity."'124
In Miller v. California, the Supreme Court set
forth a three-prong test for obscenity that is still
controlling today.125 Under Miller, the test for ob-
scenity is:
whether the 'average person, applying contemporary
community standards' would find that the work, taken
as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable
state law; and whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
1 26
In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court ruled that
the CDA failed the second prong of the Miller
test. 1 27 Therefore, in drafting COPA, Congress
tried to address this failure by including the "ma-
terial that is harmful to minors" language.
Second, in addressing the concerns of the over-
breadth of the CDA's coverage, Congress limited
the scope of COPA by only applying it to commu-
nications made for "commercial purposes,"'1 28
rather than to all individual Internet publish-
ers. 129 In addition, the scope of the legislation was
also limited to material on the World Wide Web,
as opposed to the broader world of the Internet,
which includes e-mails and chat rooms.' 30
122 Id. §231 (e) (6) (B).
123 Id. §231(e )(6)(C).
124 H.R. REP. No. 105-775, at 24 (1998).
125 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
126 Id. (citations omitted).
127 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 872-73.
128 47 U.S.C. §231(b).
129 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 599-600 (2002) (ex-
plaining how Congress responded to the Supreme Court's
concerns regarding the breadth of the CDA's coverage).
130 Id.
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B. Ashcrofi v. ACLU
While Congress took pains to craft legislation
that would respond to the Court's concerns with
the CDA, once enacted, COPA faced challenges
as well. Within a day after COPA was signed into
law,' 3 ' and a month before the law was set to go
into effect,' 3 2 the ACLU filed an action in the
United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania seeking a preliminary injunc-
tion on the COPA on the basis that it violated
adults' rights under the First and Fifth Amend-
ments. "33 The plaintiffs argued that it created a
ban on constitutionally-protected adult speech,
was not the least restrictive means of furthering
the compelling governmental interest, and was
overbroad.' 3 4
The District Court held that because COPA
prohibits publishers from posting material that is
"harmful to minors," it was a content-based regu-
lation of "nonobscene sexual expression;"' 3 5 and,
because such expression is protected under the
First Amendment, the court ruled that the statute
was "presumptively invalid and is subject to strict
scrutiny."13 6 Under strict scrutiny, the Court ex-
plained that the regulation must be "the least re-
strictive means to further the articulated inter-
est."' 137 Applying this test, the District Court found
that the government would not be able to meet its
burden at trial in proving that COPA is the least
restrictive means in preventing minors from ac-
cessing harmful material on the Internet, 138 and
therefore, the plaintiffs had succeeded in estab-
lishing a likelihood of success at trial.1 39 The Dis-
trict Court then granted the plaintiffs motion for
a preliminary injunction, barring the government
from enforcing the Act pending a trial. 140
The Attorney General of the United States ap-
pealed the lower court's ruling to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
which affirmed the District Court's ruling. 14 1
1'1 ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 169 (3d Cir. 2000).
132 ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 476 (E.D. Pa.
1999).
13'1 Id. at 476.
134 Id. at 476-77.
135 Id. at 493.
136 Id.
137 Id. (quoting Sable Communications of California,
Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
138 Id. at 497.
'39 Id. at 498.
140 Id. at 499.
However, rather than reviewing the District
Court's strict scrutiny analysis and basing its deci-
sion on these grounds, the Court of Appeals
found an alternative basis for finding the statute
to be unconstitutional."4 2 The Court of Appeals
declared COPA to be unconstitutional because
they found that the statute's "use of 'contempo-
rary community standards' to identify material
that is harmful to minors rendered the statute
substantially overbroad."' 143 The Court of Appeals
reasoned that because web publishers are unable
to verify the geographic location of all readers,
under "contemporary community standards," all
speech on the web would be subject to the most
restrictive community standards. 14 4 The govern-
ment remained enjoined from enforcing COPA
absent further action. By finding COPA to be un-
constitutional based on the basis of community
standards on the In'ternet, "most observers
agree[d] that the [Third] Circuit threw everyone
a curve when it raised the issue."' 145
On certiorari, in an 8-to-1 decision, the Su-
preme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' judg-
ment and remanded the case to the lower courts
for further action. 146 Reviewing the narrow issue
of whether COPA likely violated the First Amend-
ment because it relies, in part, on community
standards to identify material that is harmful to
minors, 14 7 Justice Thomas writing for the Court
stated, " [w] e hold only that COPA's reliance on
community standards to identify 'material that is
harmful to minors' does not by itself render the
statute overbroad for purposes of the First
Amendment."'14 8 The Court remanded the case
back to the Court of Appeals to examine whether
COPA is unconstitutional for other reasons, in-
cluding whether it is overbroad for reasons other
than reliance on community standards; whether it
is too vague; or, whether the District Court cor-
rectly concluded it will likely not survive strict
141 ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162.
142 Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 3, Ashcroft v. ACLU,
535 U.S 564 (2002) (No. 99-1324).
143 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. at 572-73.
144 ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d at 173-180.
145 Jason Krause, Can Anyone Stop Internet Porn?: Courts
Have Shot Down Laws Protecting Kids From Obscenity Online. Is
Cyberspace Suited to a Virtual Privacy Wrapper?, 88 A.B.A. J. 56,
60 (2002).
146 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564.
147 Id. at 573.
148 Id. at 585 (emphasis added).
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scrutiny analysis.' 149 A number of Justices ex-
pressed "grave doubts that COPA is consistent
with the First Amendment,"15 0 but remanded the
case back to the lower court to make that conclu-
sion. The Supreme Court's decision did not lift
the injunction, thus the government remained
enjoined from enforcing COPA absent further ac-
tion by the lower courts.' 5
1
C. The Fate of COPA
On March 6, 2003, on remand from the Su-
preme Court, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,
for the second time, held that COPA was "consti-
tutionally infirm."'1 2 The ruling upheld the in-
junction barring the government from enforcing
the law. 153 The Court found that COPA, which
they deemed to be "clearly" a content-based re-
striction, failed to satisfy strict scrutiny because it
is not narrowly tailored 154 and because it does not
use the least restrictive means to further the gov-
ernment's compelling interest. 1 5 5 In their opin-
ion, the Third Circuit recognized that Congress,
in drafting COPA, had attempted to "cure the
problems" that rendered the CDA unconstitu-
tional. 156 However, the Court ultimately found
that even though COPA was narrower than the
CDA, it still contained a number of provisions
that rendered it unconstitutional.1 57
The government may ask the Third Circuit to
rehear the case or appeal to the U.S. Supreme
Court, but it is likely that the government would
face an uphill battle in light of the "grave
doubts"'158 many of the Justices previously ex-
pressed regarding COPA's overbreadth. 159
VI. THE THIRD ATTEMPT: CHILDREN'S
INTERNET PROTECTION ACT OF 2000
Citing the fact that the Supreme Court has
149 Id. at 585-86.
150 Id. at 602 (Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, J.J., concur-
ring).
151 Id. at 586.
152 ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F. 3d 240, 245 (3d Cir. 2003
on remand from the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. ACLU,
535 U.S. 564).
153 1d. at 271.
154 Id. at 265.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 245.
157 Id.
158 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. at 602.
159 Id.
160 S. REP. No. 106-141, at 6-7 (1999) (citing Ginsberg v.
consistently reaffirmed that the government has a
compelling interest in protecting children from
exposure to sexually explicit material, 16°1 and in
finding that children are being exposed to this in-
appropriate material online by accessing the In-
ternet at home, at school, and in public libraries,
Congress attempted yet again to regulate content
on the Internet as a means to further this compel-
ling interest. This time, however, to avoid First
Amendment challenges to the legislation, Con-
gress targeted their efforts at public schools and
libraries, 16 1 reasoning that a school or library, in
accepting federal funding, "becomes a partner
with the Federal government in pursuing this
compelling interest."162
The Children's Internet Protection Act
("CIPA") 163 was signed into law on December 21,
2000. Under this law, libraries and public schools
that receive certain federal technology funds must
certify that they are using and enforcing the oper-
ation of a "technology protection measure" that
prevents computer patrons (adults and minors)
from accessing visual depictions that are "ob-
scene, child pornography, or harmful to mi-
nors."164
A. American Library Association v. United States
After CIPA was signed into law, the American
Library Association ("ALA") and other groups, in-
cluding website publishers and library patrons,
brought a suit against the United States arguing
that CIPA was unconstitutional. 165 The ALA
claimed that the law's provision requiring
software filtering on all computers effectively acts
as a content-based restriction on patrons' access
to constitutionally-protected speech. 16 6 In effect,
the law would force public libraries to violate the
First Amendment. The ALA also argued that
New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636-43 (1968); FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978); New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 757 (1982); Sable Communications of California,
Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126-28 (1989); Denver Area Ed.
Tel. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 755 (1996); Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)).
161 Id. at 9-10.
162 Id. at 6.
163 Children's Internet Protection Act, 20 U.S.C. §9134
(2000).
164 Id. §9134(f)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
165 Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d
401, 407 (E.D. Pa 2002).
166 Id.
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software filters are unreliable and ineffective,
blocking otherwise appropriate content and fail-
ing to block certain inappropriate material.'l 7
The ALA did not challenge CIPA's restrictions on
public schools. '" 8
A three-judge District Court from the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania held that CIPA was un-
constitutional under the First Amendment, rea-
soning that because of limitations inherent in
software filtering technology, any public library
that followed CIPA's requirements would restrict
library patrons' access to a substantial amount of
constitutionally-protected speech. Furthermore,
the Court asserted that there were other less re-
strictive means than requiring software filtering to
further the government's compelling interest in
protecting children from sexually explicit mate-
rial online. 1 5,.
B. United States v. American Library Association
In November 2002, following the lower court's
ruling, the Supreme Court agreed to hear argu-
ments in this case. During oral arguments regard-
ing the constitutionality of CIPA on March 5,
2003, the government conceded that software fil-
ters block some constitutionally-protected speech
and do not block some pornographic speech. 170
However, the government argued that libraries
are free to decline federal funds under the law
and thus were not required to install filtering
software. 17 1 Justice Kennedy expressed concern
with the government's assertion.' 72
On the other side, Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia, and Justice
Breyer expressed some doubts with the American
Library Association's key argument that CIPA re-
quires libraries to violate the First Amendment
rights of patrons by preventing adults from
viewing material that they have a constitutional
right to view.'17 The ALA argued that Internet ac-
cess in a public library should be viewed as a
167 Id.
168 Brief of Appellees American Library Association, et
al. at 2, Ashcroft v. Am. Library Ass'n., 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
169 Am. Library Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 490.
170 High Court Skeptical About Child Internet Protection Act,
CONGREss DAILY, Mar. 5, 2003, 2003 WL 7990280 [hereinaf-
ter CONGRESS DAILY].
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Brief of Appellees American Library Association, et
"designated public forum," and as such, the gov-
ernment cannot restrict the viewpoint of speakers
in that forum unless it satisfies the standards of
strict scrutiny. 174 Justices expressing concern with
this argument seemed to agree with the govern-
ment's contention that viewing libraries as public
forums would negatively effect a library's ability to
choose which materials to include or exclude
from their print collection. 175 The ALA, however,
was arguing that "Internet access in a public li-
brary,"'176 not the library itself, is equivalent to a
designated public forum.
C. Supreme Court Upholds CIPA
Congressional efforts to regulate Internet con-
tent had not fared well in the courts up until June
2003. The Third Circuit's most recent ruling on
March 6, 2003, in ACLU v. Ashcroft, 17 7 which
deemed COPA unconstitutional, dealt another
blow to governmental efforts to restrict access to
online content. Many observers surmised that the
tendency of federal courts and the Supreme
Court to restrain government efforts to regulate
Internet content foreshadowed what the Supreme
Court would ultimately decide regarding the con-
stitutionality of the Children's Internet Protection
Act. However, these observers were proven wrong
when the Supreme Court, by a 6-3 vote, reversed
the lower court's decision and upheld CIPA, rul-
ing that the law does not violate library patrons'
First Amendment rights and does not induce li-
braries to violate the Constitution. 7 Writing the
plurality opinion for the Court, Chief Justicc
Rehnquist explained that to determine whether
the law would force libraries to violate the First
Amendment, the Court looked to the traditional
role of libraries in society. 1 79 In doing so, the
Court found that public libraries, in fulfilling
their missions of "facilitating learning and cul-
tural enrichment,"180 must enjoy broad discretion
in deciding what materials to provide to their
al. at 15, Ashcroft v. Am. Library Ass'n., 535 U.S. 564 (2002)
(No. 02-361) [hereinafter Brief of Appellees].
175 CONGRESS DAILY, supra note 170.
176 Brief of Appellees, supra note 174, at 15.
177 322 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2003). See also discussion infra
Part V.C.
178 United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S.Ct. 2297
(2003) (plurality opinion).
179 Id. at 2303-04.
180 Id. at 2303.
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patrons.'18 Rejecting the Appellees' argument,
the Court concluded that a public library provides
Internet access to facilitate research, not to create
a universal "public forum" for web publishers.1'8 2
As Chief Justice Rehnquist articulated, "[a] public
library does not acquire Internet terminals in or-
der to create a public forum for web publishers to
express themselves, any more than it collects
books in order to provide a public forum for the
authors of books to speak."'""
The Court asserted that their holding was con-
sistent with two previous decisions where the
Court found that public forum analysis and strict
scrutiny review are "incompatible with the role of
public television stations and the role of the Na-
tional Endowment for the Arts."'18 4 In one case,
the Court ruled that "public forum principles do
not generally apply to a public television station's
editorial judgments regarding the private speech
it presents to its viewers."' 85 In the other decision,
the Court reasoned that an art funding program
must use content-based criteria in making fund-
ing decisions because of the nature of arts fund-
ing.'1 8 Similarly, the Court in United States v. Amer-
ican Library Association, reasoned that in order to
fulfill their mission of promoting research and
learning, public libraries must be allowed to con-
sider content-based criteria in making decisions
regarding their collections, including which In-
ternet materials to make available to patrons. As
the plurality opinion explained, just as public tele-
vision stations and the National Endowment for
the Arts do not create public forums, neither does
providing Internet access at public libraries. In all
of these cases, the Court has reasoned that the
government has "broad discretion to make con-
tent-based judgments in deciding what private
speech to make available to the public."' 8 7
181 Id. at 2304.
182 Id. at 2305.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 2304 (referring to the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523
U.S. 666, 672-73 (1998) and Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v.
Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998)).
185 Id. (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in
Forbes, 523 U.S. at 672-73 (1998)).
186 Id. (referencing the Supreme Court's decision in Fin-
ley, 524 U.S. 569).
187 Id.
188 Dot Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-317, §157, 116 Stat. 2766 (2002).
189 Id. §157(a).
1"( Julie Wheeler, Representing the Kids of America, at
VII. CONGRESS' LATEST ATTEMPT: DOT
KIDS IMPLEMENTATION AND
EFFICIENCY ACT OF 2002
Shortly before the end of the 107th Congress,
in another attempt to prevent children from be-
ing exposed to harmful and inappropriate mate-
rial online, lawmakers passed the Dot Kids Imple-
mentation and Efficiency Act of 2002 ("Dot Kids
Act"). 88 This new law facilitates the creation of a
second-level Internet domain, a ".kids" domain.
It will restrict information on the site to material
that is "suitable for minors" and "not harmful to
minors."' 8 - The second-level ".kids" domain will
be created under the recently commissioned ".us"
country code, 1-1'1 which is America's sovereign In-
ternet domain,'9 thus limiting the scope of the
law to the United States rather than the global In-
ternet community.'9 2 Its purpose is to create a
safe haven for American children on the Internet
and to promote a positive online experience for
them. 9 " Congressman Fred Upton (R-MI), a sup-
porter of the legislation, explained that the bill
"in essence, sets up a children's library section of
the Internet."94
Under this Act, the National Telecommunica-
tions and Information Administration ("NTIA"),
an agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce,
is responsible for overseeing the operation of the
new domain. A registry,19 5 or operator, would be
selected by the government to operate and main-
tain the new domain site.' 9 6 The registry would
also be responsible for drafting written content
standards for the site that are "consistent with the
'suitable for minors' and 'not harmful to minors'
standards" established by the legislation. 9 7 How-
ever, the law allows NTIA to take "any other
action that the NTIA considers necessary to
http://www.isp-planet.com/hosting/2002/dot-kids-us.html
(Apr. 18, 2002) [hereinafter Wheeler].
191 David McGuire, President Signs 'Dot-Kids' Legislation,
WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Dec. 4, 2002 (on file with author).
192 Wheeler, supra note 190.
13 H.R. REP. No. 107449, at 7-8 (2002).
194 Mark-Up on the .Kids Domain Before the House Comm. On
Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 8 (2002) (statement of
Rep. Fred Upton, Chairman, Telecommunications Sub-
comm.).
195 In October 2001, NTIA announced that it had en-
tered into a contract with NeuStar, Inc. Under the terms of
the contract, NeuStar, Inc. would act as the registry of the
".us" domain. H.R. REP. No. 107-449, at 7 (2002).
196 Id.
197 Id.
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establish, operate, or maintain the new domain in
accordance with the purposes" of the bill."' Fur-
thermore, if NTIA finds, upon its own review or a
"good faith petition" of the registry, that the new
domain is not serving its purpose, the NTIA can
suspend operation of the ".kids" domain. 199
Once the written content standards are estab-
lished, the registry must enter into written agree-
ments with registrars, commonly known as pub-
lishers, who chose to use the 'domain to ensure
that they are in compliance with the established
content standards.2 0 In addition, the registry
must create a process that provides "prompt, ex-
peditious and impartial dispute resolution" and
accords due process to publishers,20' so that in
cases where material that is already on the site is
believed to conflict with the content standards,
the registry can make a determination of whether
to exclude that material or to allow it to remain.
The law requires that the new domain be opera-
tional within one year after the date of enact-
ment-by December 4, 2003.202
With the Supreme Court's most recent decision
regarding online regulation,20 3 and the Court's
ruling in United States v. American Library Associa-
tion,204 legislators, law enforcement, free speech
groups, and the public are left to wonder what will
become of Congress' latest, but likely not final, at-
tempt to regulate content on the Internet. If free
speech groups or Internet publishers challenge
this new "content-based restriction"20 5 on speech,
will the law stand?
In drafting this legislation, members of Con-
gress were clear to distinguish this legislation
from previous legislation enacted to protect chil-
dren online. In remarks made during a House
Committee Hearing evaluating the bill, ranking
member of the House Telecommunications and
Internet Subcommittee Edward Markey (D-MA)
198 Dot Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act,
§157(c) (12).
199 Id. §157(i).
200 H.R. REP. No. 107-449, at 11 (2002).
201 Id. at 12.
202 Dot Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act,
§157(c) (9).
203 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) (holding
that the reliance on "community standards" to identify harm-
ful material to minors did not by itself render the Children's
Online Protection Act unconstitutional, but enjoining en-
forcement of the Act until the lower court rendered judg-
ment on further unresolved First Amendment issues).
204 See discussion infra Part VI. B.
205 H.R. REP. No. 107-449, at 8 (2002) (explaining that
emphasized that, "this approach departs from
previous congressional activity in this policy
area."20c6 However, while Members of Congress re-
peatedly stressed that First Amendment concerns
were addressed in shaping this legislation,20 7 this
Act may likely suffer the same fate as the CDA and
the COPA. If challenged in court, this new con-
tent-based regulation would not survive strict scru-
tiny.
A. The Government's Argument
Ironically, the government has acknowledged
that the ".kids" domain that will be established
under this new law is a content-based restric-
tion.208 As such, and because of the standard the
Supreme Court has applied to material on the In-
ternet, the content-based regulations imposed by
the new law must meet strict scrutiny review in or-
der to overcome the presumption of unconstitu-
tionality.209
In meeting this standard, the government ar-
gues that the Supreme Court has consistently rec-
ognized the compelling interest in shielding chil-
dren from sexually explicit material. 210 For exam-
ple, the House Energy and Commerce Committee
cited laws that require pornography to be sold be-
hind the counter or in shrink wrap at newsstands,
and regulations limiting the broadcast of certain
content during prime time hours, as regulations
that have been upheld because the government
had a compelling interest in protecting children
from harmful material.21
Furthermore, the government argues that the
means used to achieve this "compelling" end are
narrowly tailored. The new law would not impose
any restrictions on an adult's ability to use the re-
mainder of the ".us" domain, or any other part of
the World Wide Web for that matter, to publish
the Committee believes the creation of a new domain under
this legislation to be a "content-based restriction" that is
"Constitutionally sound").
206 Mark-Up on the Kids Domain Before the House Comm. On
Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 8 (2002) (statement of
Rep. Edward Markey, Member, Telecommunications Sub-
comm.) [hereinafter Statement of Markey].
207 See H.R. REP. No. 107-449 (2002).
208 Id. at 8.
209 See discussion infra Part III.A.
210 H.R. REP. No. 107-449, at 8 (2002) (citing Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); FCC v Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726 (1978); and Sable Communications of California v.
FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989)).
211 Id.
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their own materials.212 Adults would only be re-
stricted from publishing their material on the
"kids.us" domain if it was deemed "harmful to mi-
nors" by the registry. The government contends
that the Dot Kids legislation is "no different than
creating a children's section of a public li-
brary. "2 13
B. Voices of Free Speech Groups
Although this legislation has not been chal-
lenged in court, First Amendment groups were
grumbling and expressing their concern with the
legislation even before it became law. For in-
stance, the American Civil Liberties Union
("ACLU") objects to the Dot Kids Act because it
establishes a "kid-friendly" space on the Internet,
and then controls the content that will be in-
cluded on that space, effectively "set[ting] up a
system of government censorship. '"2 14 The ACLU
argues that because the information available on
the domain will be restricted to that which is "suit-
able for minors and not harmful to minors, it
is a content-based regulation that must satisfy
strict scrutiny in order to overcome the presump-
tion of unconstitutionality. 2 16
In addition, the ACLU contends that requiring
content to be screened by a third-party registrar
does not resolve the issue of censorship. As the
ACLU explains, this law allows the government,
through NTIA, to effectively control the content
of the speech on the site. The Center for Democ-
racy and Technology ("CDT"), another free
speech organization, shares these concerns about
governmental oversight and control of content on
the Internet.2 17 Free speech groups also ex-
pressed concerns with the effectiveness in creat-
ing a new site for children-citing difficulties with
maintaining and enforcing the site, and the
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Letter from Laura Murphy, Director of ACLU, and
MarvinJ.Johnson, Legislative Counsel of ACLU, to the Mem-
bers of the U.S. Senate, (Nov. 6, 2002) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Letter to Senate].
215 Dot Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act,
§157(a).
216 Letter to Senate, supra note 214.
217 Letter from Alan Davidson, Associate Director of
Center for Democracy and Technology, and Paula Bruening,
Staff Counsel of CDT, to Congressman Ron Wyden and Sena-
tor George Allen, (Sept. 12, 2002) (on file with author).
218 Letter to Senate, supra note 214.
219 See The Dot Kids Domain Act of 2001: Hearing on H.R.
realities regarding the number of children who
would actually use the site.2 1 8
Free speech groups are not the only ones who
have objected to the law. At a hearing before the
House Energy and Commerce Committee in No-
vember 2001, then head of NTIA, Nancy J. Vic-
tory, testifying about an earlier but similar version
of the legislation, remarked that she had concerns
about the constitutionality of the legislation be-
cause the bill establishes a content standard and
requires the Department of Commerce, although
indirectly, to regulate online content based on
this standard. 2 19 She explained that the courts in
the past have held that government-mandated
standards such as these are problematic. 220
NeuStar, Inc., ("NeuStar") the company re-
sponsible for establishing content standards, also
voiced strong concern with the legislation.2 2' Jim
Casey, Director of Policy and Business Develop-
ment explained that they were not the appropri-
ate body to deem what constitutes appropriate
content and what does not, explaining that, "[ilt
puts us in a position that's really outside our core
competency. "'22 2
Additionally, the Children's Online Protection
Act Commission, a congressionally-appointed
panel responsible for finding ways to protect chil-
dren online, questioned the real value of a lower-
level voluntary domain site restricted to material
for minors. 2 23 The Commission acknowledged
that such an approach would not be effective at
regulating content in e-mail, chat rooms, or in-
stant messaging 224-the services children take ad-
vantage of most often on the Internet. In addi-
tion, the Commission suggested that this method
could actually have an adverse effect on law en-
forcement because the concentration of chil-
dren's activities in this domain site could attract
predators.2 25 Instead, the Commission argued
2417 Before the House Energy and Commerce Comm., 106th Cong.
(2001) (statement of NancyJ. Victory, former Asst. Sec. of
Commerce for Telecommunications and Information)
[hereinafter Statement of Victory]
220 Id.
221 David McGuire, Voices Concerns Over 'Dot-Kids' Bill,
TECitNEWS.COM (May 21, 2002) (on file with author) [herein-
after McGuire]; Brian Krebs and David McGuire, Video
Voyeurism Bill Would Segregate Porn Sites, NEWSBYrES.COM (Apr.
17, 2001) (on file with author).
222 Id.
223" COMMISSION ON CHILD ONLINE PROTETION (COPA
COMIMISSION), 106th CONG. REPORT To CONGRESS 30 (2000).
224 Id.
225 Id.
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that one of the best ways to protect children on-
line is to educate parents and children about
avoiding harmful material on the Internet.2 26
C. Applying Strict Scrutiny
As has been discussed at length in this Com-
ment, a content-based regulation on speech is
presumptively invalid and can only be upheld if it
meets the heightened standard of strict scru-
tiny.2 2 7 In order to meet this heightened stan-
dard, the regulation must be justified by a com-
pelling governmental interest, narrowly tailored
to further that interest, and the least restrictive
means available to advance that interest. 22 8
1. Dot Kids Act: A Content-Based Regulation
Although the legislative history of the bill ac-
knowledges that this legislation is a content-based
restriction, the government could still attempt to
argue that it is not in fact content-based, and
therefore, strict scrutiny analysis is inapplicable.
Rather, the government may suggest that the stat-
ute is content-neutral, and thus would not have to
satisfy strict scrutiny.
The content-neutral argument is based on the
idea that the Dot Kids Act is simply "cyberzoning"
on the Internet; not a blanket restriction on con-
tent. Congressman Edward Markey captured this
point when he stated that the bill is "not aimed at
censoring Internet content, per se, but rather sim-
ply organizing content suitable for kids in a safe
and secure cyber zone."229 The government finds
further support for their content-neutral argu-
ment in its claims that the government itself is not
selecting the speech to be prohibited; instead,
content is determined by the registry, NeuStar.
A similar line of reasoning was used, without
much success, in Boos v. Barry.23 0 In Boos, the Su-
preme Court rejected the government's view that
the statue at issue was content-neutral. The Court
found it to be a content-based regulation because
it prohibited public discussion of "an entire
226 Id. at 9.
227 See discussion infra Part III.
228 See, e.g., Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 126.
229 Statement of Markey, supra note 206.
230 Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 319 (1988).
231 Id.
232 Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41,
54-55 (1986).
topic."23' Drawing on the Court's previous deci-
sion in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., which up-
held zoning ordinances that barred adult movie
theaters in residential neighborhoods,2 32 the
Court in Boos determined that content-based
speech regulations are those which are justified
only by reference to the content of the speech be-
ing regulated," 233 whereas, content-neutral restric-
tions are justified "without reference to the con-
tent of the regulated speech."23 4
For instance, in Renton, zoning ordinances were
passed, not to curtail the distribution of inappro-
priate behavior or speech, but rather to address
the "secondary effects" that the adult theatres fos-
tered, such as crime and decreasing property val-
ues.2 35 The Court held that these zoning ordi-
nances should be analyzed as a form of time,
place, and manner restriction on speech because
the purpose of the ordinances was to curb the
"secondary effects" of the theatres; the regulations
did not "focus on the direct impact of speech," or
the primary effects.2 36 In a time, place, and man-
ner analysis, the government's interest is not re-
lated to the communicative impact of the behav-
ior or the speech,23 7 and it is not held to the most
stringent scrutiny.
Applying these principles, the Court would
have to find that the Dot Kids Act is a
content-based regulation, and not simply a zoning
ordinance on the Internet, as Congressman Mar-
key claims. The government's purpose for enact-
ing the Dot Kids Act is to protect children from
the harmful effects of inappropriate content on
the Internet. The government's justification or
motivation for enacting the legislation is directly
related to the communicative impact of the
speech. Specifically, the potential harm to chil-
dren is directly caused by their exposure to sexu-
ally explicit and inappropriate material online. In
this instance, speech on the Internet is being reg-
ulated because of its potential direct or "primary"
impact on children; the emotive impact of this
speech on children is not a "secondary effect."23' 8
Therefore, the Dot Kids Act is clearly a content-
233 Boos, 485 U.S. at 319-21.
234 Id. at 320 (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)).
235 Renton, 475 U.S. at 49.
236 Id.
237 See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S.
123, 130-33 (1992).
238 Boos, 485 U.S. at 320-21 (citing examples of
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based regulation that must be analyzed as such
under the most stringent scrutiny.
Further support for this argument is found in
the Supreme Court's decision in Reno v. ACLU.
23
"
The Court held that the CDA was a content-based
restriction to be analyzed under the most height-
ened standard. The Court rejected the govern-
ment's assertion that the CDA is "cyberzoning" on
the Internet.2411 It distinguished the CDA from a
zoning ordinance because the purpose of the
CDA was "to protect children from the primary ef-
fects of 'indecent' and 'patently offensive' speech,
rather than any 'secondary' effect of such
speech."24 1
The language of the Dot Kids Act itself also
demonstrates that it is a content-based regulation.
The statute directs the government to draft writ-
ten content standards, albeit indirectly, via NeuS-
tar. While it is true that the Act prohibits the gov-
ernment from directly establishing these content
standards,2 4 2 the government retains a degree of
editorial control and ultimate authority to shut
down the domain if the new domain "is not serv-
ing its intended purpose." 243 As Congressman
Shimkus (R-IL), a strong advocate of the legisla-
tion, explains, "[o]n the remote chance that
"kids.us" degenerates into a place with harmful
material, the bill calls for the Department of Com-
merce to 'pull the plug' on the space." 2 4 4 This is
where the government's assertion that the govern-
ment itself is not selecting the speech to be pro-
hibited falls apart. The editorial control the gov-
ernment maintains over the domain site is clearly
a "censorship scheme" 245 that would have to sur-
vive the most stringent scrutiny to be found con-
stitutional.
Furthermore, the Dot Kids' legislative "scheme"
clearly cannot be analogized to legislation estab-
lishing the public broadcasting system 24 6 because
the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 specifically
content-neutral speech regulations where the regulation is
justified because of the "secondary effects" of the speech).
239 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 867-68 (1997) (recog-
nizing that the Communications Decency Act is a "content-
based blanket restriction on speech," and therefore, should
not be analyzed as a form of time, place, and manner regula-
tion).
24) Id. at 867-68.
241 Id. at 868.
242 Dot Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act,
§157(c)(1).
243 Id. §157(i).
244 Child-Friendly Internet Domain: Hearing on S.2537, the
Dot Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act of 2002, Before the Sen-
provides that the government may not control the
contents or distribution of public broadcasting
programming.24 7 In fact, for more than twenty
five years, public broadcasting has been funded by
the federal government two years ahead of the fis-
cal year in which the funding is allocated. This
advance funding mechanism addresses First
Amendment concerns by helping insulate public
broadcasting from politically-motivated interfer-
ence with programming.
2. Compelling Interest is Recognized
Once it is established that the Dot Kids Act is a
content-based regulation, it must be subject to
strict scrutiny analysis. First, the restriction must
be necessary to serve a compelling state inter-
est.248 There is a well-recognized interest in pro-
tecting children from harmful material; 249 there-
fore, there is no dispute that the government's in-
terest in protecting children from harmful materi-
als online is compelling. However, as the Su-
preme Court explained in Reno v. ACLU, that in-
terest "does not justify an unnecessarily broad sup-
pression of speech." 25 1' This is where the disagree-
ment lies-whether the Dot Kids Act is narrowly
tailored, and the least restrictive means to satisfy
this compelling interest.
3. Not Narrowly Tailored to Satisfy Government's
Interest
The government contends that the Dot Kids
legislation is narrowly tailored to meet the govern-
ment's compelling interest. 25 1 However, this asser-
tion fails to recognize prior Supreme Court deci-
sions in which the Court has ruled that the "availa-
bility of alternatives" demonstrates that the statute
is not sufficiently narrowly tailored.2 52 Applying
this principle, because other less restrictive
ate Subcomm. on Science, Technology and Space of the Comm. on
Commerce, Science and Transportation, 107th Cong. (2002)
(statement of Rep. John Shimkus, Member, House Energy
and Commerce Comm.).
245 Letter to Senate, supra note 214.
246 See id.
247 Public Broadcasting Act, 47 U.S.C. §396 (2002).
248 See, e.g., Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 126.
249 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 875 (citing Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726 (1978)).
250 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 875.
251 H.R. REp. No. 107449, at 8 (2002).
252 Boos, 485 U.S. at 329.
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alternatives for protecting children online already
exist, such as Internet safety education, the Court
would have to hold that the Dot Kids Act measure
is not sufficiently narrowly tailored to satisfy strict
scrutiny.
a. Overly Broad
The question of whether a regulation is nar-
rowly tailored to serve a compelling interest is
similar to asking whether a statute is overly broad.
A statute is overbroad if it prohibits more than
what is constitutionally allowed, or sweeps more
broadly than is permissible.2 53 In this case, the
Court is likely to rule that the Dot Kids is not nar-
rowly tailored because it restricts a substantial
amount of constitutionally-protected speech for
adults and minors over the age of twelve.
First, the definition "harmful to minors" pro-
vided in the Dot Kids Act renders the legislation
substantially broad. The term "minors" as pro-
vided in the Dot Kids Act parallels the definition
provided in Congress' earlier legislative effort, the
Children's Online Protection Act, with the excep-
tion that the Dot Kids Act's definition of "minors"
is limited to those under thirteen years of age,25 4
whereas COPA defines "minors" as those under
seventeen years of age.25 5 By shrinking the popu-
lation of "minors," the Dot Kids legislation at-
tempts to narrow this definition. However, re-de-
fining the term "minors" does nothing to correct
the overbreadth of this legislation. 256
In some instances, the standards established in
the legislation under the term "minors" would
prohibit speech that is unconstitutional. But in
other instances, the Dot Kids Act's narrow defini-
tion of "minors" would exclude any material from
the domain that is harmful to those twelve years
and under, effectively prohibiting a vast amount
of constitutionally-protected speech for adults
and for minors over the age of twelve. For in-
stance, material that is "suitable" and important
for fourteen-year-olds to obtain, such as health
253 ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d at 266.
254 H.R. REp. No. 107-449, at 15 (2002).
255 ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d at 246.
256 Id. at 268 (explaining how the term "minor" renders
COPA overly broad).
257 Dot Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act,
§157(c) (11).
258 The PBS Kids' website is found at http://www.pb-
skids.org.
information or sex education, may not be "suita-
ble" for five-year-olds, and thus would be barred
from the site. In the end, this narrowing of the
term "minors" prohibits an even greater amount
of speech that is not only constitutionally-pro-
tected for adults, but is constitutionally-protected
for children over the age of twelve. It sweeps
more broadly than even COPA.
Additionally-, the Dot Kids Act is overly broad
because it proscribes speech that is constitution-
ally admissible even for minors under the age of
thirteen. The Dot Kids legislation "prohibits
hyperlinks in the new domain that take new do-
main users outside of the new domain. '" 257 This
provision would exclude a significant number of
Internet publishers and speakers who do not even
publish sexually explicit or obscene material, but
who choose to have hyperlinks on their site. For
instance, the PBS Kids' website,258 one of the most
popular websites for kids, would be excluded
from the new domain because the PBS site has
hyperlinks to relevant newspaper articles, volun-
teer organizations, and youth groups.
In attempting to counteract claims of over-
breadth, the government could offer the addi-
tional argument that the Dot Kids measure does
not prohibit more than what is allowed because it
leaves open other alternative means of communi-
cation. 2 59 Congress suggested exactly this during
mark-up of the bill.2 60 Congressman Markey ex-
plained that the legislation does not subject all In-
ternet communications to a "harmful to minors"
standard; it only applies to one subdomain in the
entire ".us" domain.2 6'
This argument, however, failed when the gov-
ernment used it in Reno v. ACLU, and it will fail in
this context as well. As the Supreme Court ruled
in Reno, it is "immaterial" whether such speech
would be feasible on other areas of the Internet
because the legislation regulates speech on the
basis of its content; therefore, any time, place, and
manner analysis is inapplicable.2 62 Therefore, re-
gardless of whether the legislation leaves open
259 See e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 879-80 (attempting
to curb the overbreadth of the CDA, the government argues
that it is constitutional because it leaves open other channels
of communication).
260 Mark-Up on the .Kids Domain: Hearing Before the House
Comm. On Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 9 (2002).
261 Id. at 8 (statement of Rep. Edward Markey, Member,
Telecommunications Subcomm.).
262 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 879-80.
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other alternative means of communication, the
Dot Kids Act is still overly broad.
b. Vague
The Act is also rendered unconstitutional be-
cause it is vague. The Third Circuit explained,
"[a] statute is void for vagueness if it 'forbids ...
the doing of an act in terms so vague that [per-
sons] of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its applica-
tion."' 26 3 In this instance, NeuStar must deter-
mine what is "suitable for minors" and "not harm-
ful to minors." However, a recent government re-
port demonstrates that there is much disagree-
ment about which material is suitable for minors
and which material is harmful.2 64 One critic of the
legislation, commenting on the difficulty in deter-
mining what the content of the new domain
should be, said, "What would probably happen is
that we would end up with content that meets the
lowest common denominator. The dot.kids
wouldn't have any value."2 65 As critics suggest and
the government's own report demonstrates, be-
cause the statute's words do not seem to have a
"common understanding, '" 26 6 NeuStar will face
great difficulty in defining these terms in a way
that makes it clear to an ordinary person what ex-
actly is prohibited from the new domain. As a re-
sult, the Dot Kids Act's terms would not withstand
a vagueness challenge. In sum, the Dot Kids Act
must be rendered unconstitutional because it is
not narrowly tailored to satisfy strict scrutiny.
4. Not the Least Restrictive Means
The Supreme Court has explained that the bur-
den on adult speech is unacceptable "if less re-
strictive alternatives would be at least as effective
in achieving the legitimate purpose that the stat-
ute was enacted to serve."26 7 Not only is the Dot
Kids Act rendered unconstitutional because
it is not narrowly tailored, but it is also
263 ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d at 269 (quoting Connally
v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
264 Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 32, Ashcroft v. ACLU,
535 U.S 564 (2002) (No. 99-1324) (citing a congressional re-
port conducted by the National Research Council, which
found that there is "widespread disagreement" about what is
inappropriate for minors).
265 MacPherson, supra note 5 at A17.
266 Boos, 485 U.S. at 332 (defining the vagueness test as
"communicating its reach in words of common
unconstitutional because it is not the least restric-
tive means to further the government's interest-
to safeguard children from harmful material on-
line.
In this context, a method or policy, such as pro-
moting Internet safety education, that would not
burden constitutionally-protected speech would
be a less restrictive means; much less restrictive
than the ".kids" domain pushed by Congress. In
fact, two important government reports released
in the past few years found that the best way to
protect children from harmful material online
was by educating children and their parents about
Internet safety. 2 68 One of these reports, commis-
sioned by Congress and issued by the National
Academies' National Research Council (NRC),
specifically stated that while technology and pub-
lic policy "have important roles to play," they will
not provide a complete solution to protecting
children online.269 What is important, the NRC
study concluded, is "social and educational strate-
gies to develop in minors an ethic of responsible
choice and the skills to effectuate these choices
and to cope with exposure" so as to prevent chil-
dren from being harmed by exposure to inappro-
priate materials online.2 70 Thus, without prohibit-
ing any form of speech, the government could
easily fund programs that educate parents and
children about safe ways to search the Internet.
Furthermore, the government could assume a
policy of encouraging the private sector to create
safe "cyber playgrounds," for children on the In-
ternet. Encouraging private sector efforts avoids
government regulation of speech on the Internet,
and would be just as effective in protecting chil-
dren as government-established domains. Nancy
Victory stressed in her testimony before Congress
that the NTIA supports private sector efforts to
address concerns that children are being exposed
to harmful material on the Internet. She ap-
plauded private sector initiatives to provide chil-
dren access to quality content on the Internet. 27 1
The ".kids" domain will not be successful if web
understanding").
267 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 874 (quoting Sable Commu-
nications, 492 U.S. at 126).
268 Letter to Senate, supra note 214.
269 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY
AND THE INTERNET Executive Summary §14.3 (2002) [herein-
after NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL].
270 Id.
271 Statement of Victory, supra note 219.
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publishers refuse to publish, or are prohibited
from publishing their material on the site. Trying
to convince children's web publishers, or regis-
trars, to publish their material on the new domain
could be an uphill battle because of the stringent
registration requirements provided in the legisla-
tion. The Dot Kids Act requires registrars to enter
into written agreements "that require that use of
the new domain is in accordance with the stan-
dards and requirements to the registry."2 72 Cur-
rently, website publishers and registrars are not
required to enter into written agreements or to
police their own efforts. There is very little incen-
tive for them to publish on a site where they
would be expected to follow such stringent re-
quirements.
Furthermore, the domain may not be effective
because it is unlikely that children will visit the
site. One provision of the Dot Kids Act prohibits
"two-way and multiuser interactive services" in the
new domain, except in cases where a registrar can
guarantee that the services adhere to the content
standards developed for the domain.2 73 As the
House Committee Report explains, this provision
is intended to prohibit services such as instant
messaging, chat, and e-mail. 274 However, children
are using the Internet today to e-mail and engage
in chat rooms more than any other age group in
the U.S., and more than many other online activi-
ties. 275 It only makes sense that children are going
to go where they can use the services that they
want to use-e-mail, chat, and instant messaging.
If the ".kids" domain does not offer these services,
children will not visit it.
Finally, the government could more effectively
further its interest in safeguarding children by
funding initiatives that enforce criminal statutes
already in place-child pornography laws and
laws prohibiting obscenity.27 6 Money spent crack-
ing down on Web publishers and speakers who vi-
olate these laws is money spent wisely. In the end,
272 Dot Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act,
§157(c) (2).
273 Id. §157(c)(10).
274 H.R. REP. No. 107-449, at 12 (2002).
275 U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, supra note 2, at 52 (finding
that teenagers and young adults are online to engage in chat
rooms more than any other age group and older children
and young adults use e-mail at much higher levels than
adults).
276 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 269, at §14.
277 CORPORATION FOR PUBLIC BROADCASTING, CONNECTED
TO THE FUTURE: A REPORT ON CHILDREN'S INTERNET
the ".kids" domain will not play any part in
decreasing children's exposure to the harmful
material that is found throughout the Internet.
As an added twist, a recent study found that
parents are more likely to surf the Internet with
their children. 277 In fact, parents' involvement
with their children's Internet use increased signif-
icantly from 2000 to 2002.278 The same study, con-
ducted by the Corporation for Public Broadcast-
ing, reported that 81% of parents felt the Internet
is important to their children's learning.279 Per-
haps children are not being exposed to indecent
material as much as we think. Perhaps children
are actually reaping the benefits of the Internet.
D. Not Justified as a Medium-Based Regulation
While the Dot Kids Act fails strict scrutiny, it is
true that in some mediums, such as traditional
broadcast, 280 Congress has upheld content-based
regulations on a lower level scrutiny because,
viewed in the context of that medium, "special
treatment" is justified. 28' The Supreme Court has
cited various reasons for this "special treatment"
for certain media-the history of government reg-
ulation, the scarcity of available broadcast fre-
quencies, and the "invasive" nature of the me-
dium.
Many would argue that the Internet's character-
istics encompassing print, traditional broadcast,
and cable media-should justify a similar "special
treatment" by the courts. Therefore, content-
based regulations on the Internet, not unlike
those placed on broadcasting, would be subject to
a lower level of scrutiny. However, one of the Su-
preme Court's principal holdings in Reno v. ACLU
was that the Internet shared none of the special
factors recognized to justify government regula-
tion, and thus deserves the highest level of First
Amendment protection. 28 2 So, unless the Su-
preme Court is willing to review its conclusion
USE (2002).
278 Id. at 7.
279 Id.
280 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (up-
holding a declaratory order of the FCC holding that broad-
cast of a vulgar and offensive monologue during the after-
noon could be subject to administrative sanctions because, as
the Court explained, constitutional protection available for a
vulgar monologue, though not obscene, depended on the
context of the broadcast).
281 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 866-67.
282 Id. at 868-870.
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that these previously cited factors, which justify
the application of a lower-level of scrutiny to con-
tent-based regulations in certain media, "are not
present in cyberspace,"'218 strict scrutiny analysis
on Internet content regulations will stand.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In the last decade, the Internet has revolution-
ized the way we live, conduct business, and com-
municate. As one telecommunications analyst
concluded, the Internet "exercises enormous in-
fluence on the commercial, educational, and so-
cial future" of Americans. 284 It also provides an
unbridled source of information for children to
use in their learning and education. However,
this source of great promise for children can also
be a source of great concern 2 5 because of the
ready availability of sexually explicit and harmful
materials on the Internet.
Congress has attempted to protect America's
most vulnerable group, children, but legislative
initiatives have largely failed. In the future,
lawmakers must re-evaluate their past efforts and
heed the advice of experts and commissions to
283 Id. at 868.
284 JASON OXMAN, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMIS-
SION, OFFICE OF PLANS AND POLICY, THE FCC AND THE UN-
REGULATION OF THE INTERNET, OPP WORKING PAPER No. 31, 4
(July 1999).
285 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, YOUTH, supra note 269,
determine the best approaches for protecting
children online. Hopefully they will realize there
is no magic bullet2 8 6 that will effectively protect
children in this global community. In fact, one of
the best methods may be as simple as funding ed-
ucational and social initiatives that teach children
and parents about the inherent dangers of the In-
ternet.28 7 Ad campaigns can promote public
awareness of new technologies available to protect
children on the Internet. Congress may also con-
sider encouraging private sector initiatives that
block or filter harmful material. The online in-
dustry also has a responsibility to play a role in
protecting children. Additional, consideration
should be given to increase funding for law en-
forcement efforts to aggressively enforce anti-ob-
scenity laws. Each of these proposed methods can
be just as effective, if not more so, than efforts ini-
tiated by Congress to date. These approaches bal-
ance First Amendment values with the compelling
need to protect children from harmful material
online. Unlike past efforts, they will pose the least
adverse impact on constitutionally-protected
speech.
at §1.1.
286 Id. at §14.3 (concluding that "There is no single or
simple answer to controlling the access of minors to inappro-
priate material on the Web.").
287 Id.
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